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Abstract
Infinity, in various guises, has been invoked recently in order to ‘explain’ a num-
ber of important questions regarding observable phenomena in science, and in par-
ticular in cosmology. Such explanations are by their nature speculative. Here we
introduce the notions of relative infinity, closure, and economy of explanation and
ask: to what extent explanations involving relative or real constructed infinities can
be treated as reasonable?
1 Background
An important ingredient of many scientific explanations of observable phenomena, in-
cluding those pertaining to the Universe itself as a whole, have been the so-called un-
observable(s), i.e. variables or concepts entering a theoretical explanation without a
phenomenologically manifest counterpart, or theoretical entities lying beyond the limits
of (current) observability, about which the theory in question is taken to make true claims
and which play an indispensable causal-explanatory role. These have been the subject of
a great deal of debate, and in particular whether theories making explanatory use of such
unobservable theoretical entities (UTEs) can be treated as complete, or as literally true
(as opposed to merely instrumentally efficacious). Despite these debates, it is fair to say
that most scientists (as well as the majority of philosophers of science, adhering to sci-
entific realism) have come to terms with the theoretical indispensability and existence of
such entities, provided the theory under consideration is currently complete, i.e. capable
of unambiguously accounting for the current observations in its domain of applicability,
as well as making novel testable predictions.1
1It is important to note that, as opposed to current completeness, the notion of all time completeness
of theories is problematic in principle, given that all theories need to stand to be corrected by future
observations and, in this sense, must remain open.
Such unobservable theoretical entities (UTEs) can be broadly divided into four cat-
egories. The first consists of those that, though unobservable at a certain epoch, later
become observable. Subatomic particles2 are examples of this type of UTEs.
The second category consists of concepts which are by definition/construction unob-
servable and yet lead to observable consequences, such as the wave function in quantum
mechanics, which even though it itself does not have a direct observable counterpart its
square defines probabilities which are measurable.
The third category consists of speculative UTEs that are invoked as metaphysical
extensions of a successful and predictive theory in order to give alternative interpretations
of how the theory can account for certain observations. A prime example of this is the so
called ‘many worlds’ interpretation of Quantum Mechanics due to Everett [2] which, while
denying the reality of the collapse of the wave function assumed in usual interpretations of
quantum mechanics, accords reality to the wave function as well as all possible histories,
postulating that each represents a different physically real and non-interacting ’world’.
Finally, the fourth category consists of speculative UTEs that are invoked in order
to explain an observed aspect of the Universe within an incomplete theory. The infinite
(or very large) number of universes assumed by some current versions of the ‘Multiverse’
idea3 based, for example, on the eternal inflationary scenario [4] or the so-called String
Theory ‘Landscape’ (see e.g. [5]), are examples of such speculative UTEs. Such scenarios
are often employed in order to explain seemingly anthropic fine-tunings in some cosmo-
logical parameters whose values are currently not accounted for in the so called standard
cosmological model, such as the observed value of the cosmological constant Λ.
An important feature of the third and to some extent the fourth of the above cate-
gories is that the number of often causally isolated (and hence in principle impossible to
observe directly) UTEs they invoke is extremely large (relative to the relevant scales of the
observational Universe; for example the number of elementary particles in the observable
Universe), or in fact infinite, which raises important questions about their ontological
status.4 While, as realists and naturalists, we defend the theoretical indispensability and
ontological reality of the first two kinds of UTEs, the aim of this paper is to ask to
what extent the employment of the latter two types of UTEs, which are postulated to
be very large (in the sense made precise below), or infinite, in number are justifiable as
2It is important to differentiate between those subatomic particles that are directly visible, such as
electrons, and those that are only ”observable” in an inferential way, as is the case with most such particles
- such as Higgs. Such differentiation does not construe observables and unobservables as ontologically
distinct (thus opening the door to instrumentalist skepticism); the different terms merely reflecting a
methodological difference in our access to them (non-inferential or inferential).
3See e.g. [3] for a number of such scenarios.
4It is not easy to give an uncontroversial answer to the question of which branch of physics initiated
the contemporary speculative discussion of a plurality (i.e. very large or infinity) of universes. While
the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics dates back to the mid-1950s, and surely had a non-
negligible influence outside quantum physics (essentially re-injecting the millennia-old idea of a plurality
of worlds with scientific respectability), the concept of Multiverse which emerged after the rise, in the
1980s, of the eternal inflation scenario [4, 6], developed in relative independence from quantum mechanical
interpretations. More recently, the so called String Landscape has provided another avenue for postulating
a vast number of universes, corresponding to the large number of possible false vacua allowed by String
Theory. For the purposes of this paper, it will suffice to note that, being underpinned by an incomplete
theory and lacking any observational support or confirmed predictions, such an idea remains speculative.
For a comprehensive history of the idea of Multiverse in the XX century, see [7].
explanatory tools in a scientific theory.
2 Infinity in Mathematics
Before turning to the discussion of the infinite turn in Section 4, it is worthwhile to very
briefly recall the status of infinity in Mathematics and in conceptualisations of the physical
Universe, respectively.
The intuitive idea of (countable) infinity is construed as the limit of the sequence of
natural numbers 1, 2, 3, .... . Throughout history it has been assumed, by and large, that
such infinities are asymptotic limits rather than existing limits in reality in finite time.
The founding authority on this question, whose influence has extended since antiquity
was Aristotle, who, in his Physics, struggled with the paradoxes posed by the concept of
infinity, invoked in the context of his inquiry on time, change and division of magnitudes.
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle drew an important distinction between potential infinity
and actual infinity (i.e. between infinity as a process and infinity as a completed given
cognitive object). In line with his empiricist concerns, Aristotle argued that everything
that is is infinitely divisible in potentia, and yet there is no possible infinity in actu, which
can be reached by eternal addition or subtraction (see Phys. III.6). For Aristotle, who
drew strict demarcating lines between metaphysics, physics and mathematics, the role of
the physicists is to examine real entities, without applying the quantitative abstractions
of the geometer and the arithmetician into their inquiry into physical reality. Aristotle’s
universe is a finite one, in which it is impossible to exceed every definite magnitude, for
if it were possible there would be something bigger than the heavens (Phys. III.7, 207b).
Following a rather complex history, the Aristotelian paradigm regarding infinity re-
mained dominant for centuries, becoming refined by the late Medieval and early modern
philosophers. Eventually, during the Renaissance the notion of a physically infinite cos-
mos was rehabilitated through the work of influential natural philosophers such as Bruno,
Campanella and, particularly, Galileo whose laws of motion, developed through an anti-
Aristotelian mathematised physics, challenged the finite paradigm of classical cosmology
and introduced the concept of an infinite universe.5
Towards the end of the 19th century, it was shown by Cantor, through his development
of Set Theory, that, in addition to the countable infinity of natural numbers, it was possible
to think in a mathematically rigorous way of infinities larger than the infinity of the natural
numbers. An important example of such larger infinities is the so called continuum, which
can be thought of as the set of all the irrational numbers that reside between any two whole
or rational numbers. In fact Cantor showed that an unlimited hierarchy of larger and
larger infinities can be constructed, the so called transfinite numbers, that grow without
limit. Cantor’s ideas were received with suspicion even among many mathematicians.
David Hilbert, to mention one pre-eminent example, was very critical of such numbers, as
he was of the concept of infinity overall, especially in relation to the physical Universe [9].
Our aim here is not to delve into these controversies within Mathematics, but rather to
recall that even in the context of pure Mathematics there are different positions regarding
the admissibility of infinity and of the Cantorian transfinite numbers. The key question
5See the classic work of Alexandre Koyre, and his well-known thesis of a crucial passage, specific of
modernity, from the closed world to the infinite universe [8].
for us here, however, is: what could be the status and possible relevance of such numbers
for physical reality and scientific explanations?
2.1 Mathematics and Reality
A crucial question regarding Mathematics is whether mathematical concepts, statements
and theorems are discovered (i.e. exist out there, independently of us), or are constructed
(by us)? This debate has been raging in the philosophy of mathematics for decades, so
far with no clear consensus. Positions on this question range from neurobiological reduc-
tionism, viewing mathematics as a cognitive product entirely contingent on the activity
of our brain [10, 11], to mathematical Platonism defending the independent existence of
mathematical objects, or even postulating a ’third realm’ (neither physical nor mental),
populated by such eternal objects [10, 12]. Others have gone even further and have di-
rectly associated physical reality with mathematical structures, arguing that ’our universe
is mathematics’ [13].
Given that the human brain is a biological construct, and hence contingently emerged
from within the physical world, it would not be surprising, from a naturalist perspective,
if its cognitive-neurobiological features evolved as conditioned by the structure of the
Universe. For example, our observable physical Universe seems to satisfy the 2-valued
logic in its macroscopic structure and dynamics. It is therefore unsurprising that we have
developed a mathematics based on such a logic. To this extent, the mathematics we
have is a consequence of the logic that seems to be hard wired in the structure of the
physical Universe we inhabit (and, consequently, in our brains), rather than vice versa.
Yet, an explanation still seems to be pending as to how mathematical concepts developed
in an abstract setting can come to have, at a later time, relevance for empirical, physical,
reality (which following [14], is usually referred to as the ‘unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics in the natural sciences’).
Another key question is: do all statements/concepts that could be developed within
Mathematics have a counterpart in physical reality? This is a very difficult and in principle
an open question, but it is certainly not at all obvious that all mathematical concepts
should necessarily have a counterpart in the real Universe, particularly (and as it primarily
concerns us here) in the case of a concept such as infinity, which is an asymptotic limiting
concept whose application to the physical universe presents obvious conceptual obstacles
(as we have learnt to acknowledge since, at least, Kant).
3 Infinity and the physical Universe
In discussions of infinity, and especially of its possible connection and relevance to the real
Universe, the key questions to bear in mind are: (a) whether we think of infinity as an
actual or potential concept, i.e. whether we have in mind an open unending process, or
an already constructed infinity. Clearly the existence of the former does not necessarily
require a Universe which is in some actual sense infinite at any given time; (b) The
distinction between the space of potential possibilities and the space of actually existing
possibilities. These are clearly not identical, as the latter is subject to the contingencies
provided by the underpinning physical laws; and (c) The distinction between real infinities
and extremely large numbers. In this connection it is useful to define, for a given system,
including the Universe as a whole, the notion of relative infinity as numbers that are very
much larger than the size (or any other important physical characteristic) of the system,
say in Planck units.
In contemporary physical theories, the concept of infinity arises in at least three
distinct settings: (i) possible infinities of space and/or time, corresponding to the size
(whether the extremely small or the extremely large), and the age (whether in the past or
future) of the Universe; (ii) infinities arising at certain predicted limits of viable theories,
such as the black holes or the cosmological singularities suggested by general relativity,
and (iii) infinite ensembles used as tools for explaining observables.
Regarding infinities of type (i), it is not clear how they can be established observationally.6
The question of future eternality does not pose a similar problem, as it will take an infi-
nite time to arrive!7 In particular, it is not clear whether it is possible, at any point in
its history, to distinguish in practice between a universe that possesses an infinite extent
and one that is extremely large, say relative to its observable size. For example, since
Einstein’s field equations do not constrain the overall topology of the Universe (see e.g.
[17, 18, 19]), the Universe could be finite spatially but appear limitless, if it has a size
much larger than the present horizon. Furthermore, even if it was possible to determine
that the Universe is infinite in extent in principle (which is unlikely in practice), it is not
at all clear whether one could, in a physical context, distinguish between the hierarchies
of infinities described by Cantor’s set theory, and how such infinities could be of relevance
in a real Universe. For example, if our current understanding of the physical laws under-
pinning the structure and evolution of the Universe, and our attempts at formulating a
theory of quantum gravity, are correct, spacetime is likely to be discrete at a fundamental
level (thus not allowing infinite divisibility). If so, even the continuum, let alone Cantor’s
transfinite numbers, is unlikely to be anywhere instantiated in the physical structure of
the real Universe.
The infinities of type (ii) are generally thought to arise as a result of inadmissible
applications of theories outside their domains of applicability. As a result they are often
thought as temporary placeholders, to be removed (perhaps re-normalised) once appro-
priate corrections are made to the theory, or once a more reasonable theory of the relevant
domain is formulated. On the other hand the presence of infinities of the type (iii) seem
to be different in nature with a different methodological status, in that they are often
assumed to exist by choice, in order to offer explanations for some puzzling features of
the observable Universe.
To summarise, the infinities invoked in speculative cosmological accounts of the real
Universe are likely to be mostly of the type (iii) and hence voluntarily chosen (as op-
posed to those that arise at less well understood limits of classical theories, such as
general relativity, and grudgingly tolerated as temporary placeholders) and based on ei-
ther the questionable trans-categorial extension of mathematical concepts into the phys-
ical/cosmological domain, or on metaphysical speculation, rather than motivated by em-
6This is true at least regarding the spatial extent of the Universe. It is interesting to ask if it is possible
to establish observationally whether the Universe was in fact past eternal (see for e.g. [15])
7For a critique of the intelligibility of the notion of an actual, physical infinite set see [16]. Note
that our argument does not depend on this ontological assumption: we are more concerned with the
epistemological issue of what does and what doesn’t count as an explanatory hypothesis, bracketing the
ontological question.
pirical observations.
4 The infinite turn
Even though the idea of infinity has a relatively long history, its use in mainstream sci-
ence/cosmology can be said to have accelerated and widened over the recent years. There
seems to have been an intentional turn to the infinite; in the sense that attempts have
been made to answer a range of fundamental questions, in both science and philosophy8,
by invoking extremely large or even infinite ensembles of actually existing universes – far
(or infinitely) larger than the system to be explained. Below we give a brief discussion of
some of these attempts.
4.1 Relative or real infinities in explaining the Universe
In traditional scientific explanations the Universe was viewed as a system with a single
and connected unfolding reality. More recently, however, it has become somewhat ac-
ceptable to explain features of our observed Universe in terms of (relative or real) infinite
multiplicity of universes, allegedly covering the full spectrum of possible parameter values
of interest. This development can be imputed to the encounter of two trends: on the
one hand incomplete theories which suggest a possible proliferation of universes, and on
the other the need to explain the seeming fine-tuning of certain cosmological parameters.
In discussing these developments it is essential to distinguish different cases, depending
upon whether the underlying theory employed is complete or incomplete.
4.1.1 Many world interpretation of QM
One of the first speculative attempts in this direction was due to Everett [2], who in 1957
gave an interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which the wave function is
treated as a real and literal description of the world, thus denying its collapse in the process
of observation to a single observed state. Instead, he postulated that all other branching
outcomes are possible alternative histories, each representing an actual, physically real
‘world’ (or ‘universe’) populated by slightly different copies of observers.9 This is one of
the earlier examples, in physics10, of what might be called an infinite ontological jump, i.e.
treating all that is potentially possible as in fact actually existing. A crucial feature of this
speculative picture is the non-interacting nature of these ‘worlds’, rendering questionable
their status as entities amenable to scientific verification.
4.1.2 Landscape and Multiverse
The Multiverse idea has been invoked in a number of settings. In the context of String
Theory, the concept of Multiverse (see for example [5, 3]) is underpinned by a so called
Landscape which itself hinges on a number of important assumptions which is fair to
8We shall leave the discussion of infinite turn in Philosophy for a future article [20].
9For a recent philosophical defence of the Everettian hypothesis see [21].
10The idea of an infinity of possible worlds has a longer tradition in philosophical metaphysics, from
Leibniz [22] to Lewis [23].
say are speculative in nature, at least at present.11 These include (i) the assumption that
String Theory, as it stands, is a complete theory of Physics and (ii) that, at least implicitly,
there is a natural mechanism of compactification, from 10 or 11 dimensions to the observed
4-dimensional spacetime, even though such mechanisms are not known at present, within
the theory itself. Regarding (i), it is fair to say that String Theory, despite its successes
in the direction of unifying Quantum Physics and Gravity, is not a completed theory with
clearly verified observable predictions. Clearly until it is established as a completed theory,
with clear testable predictions, taking seriously its speculative potential consequences is
problematic (see Sec 5 below for further discussion). Concerning (ii), as far as we are aware
all attempts at finding natural and generic mechanisms for compactification within String
Theory itself have so far been unsuccessful. This absence, were it to persist, is potentially
very problematic as it might indicate that such a mechanism may require a meta-theory
that would transcend String Theory itself, as it is currently understood. Furthermore,
there is no guarantee that such a mechanism(s) would result in the vast number of viable
compactifications, which are similar to our Universe, as their end states12 which is what
is normally assumed, at least implicitly, in justifying the Multiverse scenario. In any
event even if such enormous multi-attractor settings exist, it is unlikely they could all
be realised simultaneously. In classical settings, dynamical systems can possess multiple
attractors. In that case, however, which attractor the system tends to will depend on
which basin of attraction the initial conditions are set in. Thus in the Landscape setting
the problem of why this compactification and not another could be related to how the
initial conditions are set. In the quantum settings the problem is more complicated and
the outcome depends on how the probability decay rates are defined, which again may
point to an external meta theory/mechanism.
The other setting in which the concept of Multiverse is invoked is in the context of so
called eternal inflation. Again even though inflation has had great success, particularly
in explaining structure formation in the early Universe, it is fair to say that (rather than
being a theory) it remains a (set of) model(s) which as yet have not been successfully
embedded within a complete theory of fundamental interactions.
To summarise, the Multiverse scenario is an example of an idea based on potential
speculative outcomes of an incomplete theory under construction and without unambigu-
ous empirical confirmation (we question whether the consequence of an incomplete theory
can be legitimately called a ‘prediction’)13 of where the theory is implicitly taken to be
11See, for example, [24] for arguments by other authors not proponents of the Multiverse idea.
12It is known that dynamical systems can have multiple attractors, but it is extremely difficult to imag-
ine a dynamics arising from a physical theory which gives rise to 10100 to 10500 number of compactified
end states. In fact it is very likely that the number of viable compactifications is in fact far smaller, which
raises the question of how they are selected!
13Compare the way in which inflation ‘predicts’ eternal inflation and the formation of an infinite number
of universes with the way in which General Relativity predicted the (now observationally confirmed)
existence of gravitational waves, or the way in which the wave theory of light predicted a bright spot at
the centre of a shadow cast by a round object. Note that inflation itself was originally postulated as an
inference to the best explanation, in order to account for the observed lack of magnetic monopoles, the
flatness of spacetime, and the homogeneity and isotropy of the observable universe. It aims at doing so
by offering the description of a physical mechanism responsible for inflation. While 1) the fundamental
theory underpinning such a mechanism is not yet fully understood, and 2) there remains the possibility
that other non-inflationary explanations might be given in the future for the observations that originally
motivated it, we look favourably upon it because, unlike multiverse theories, inflation offers a speculative
complete and its speculative possible consequences taken as ontologically real.
5 Closure, Empirical Testing and Explanation
The notion of closure plays a pivotal role in various employments of the notion of infinity
in scientific and philosophical explanations. In the case of the former, such as in Many
Worlds, Anthropic or Multiverse reasonings, there is an urge to implicitly assume that
our present understanding of the laws of nature (and the Universe) is complete, in what
amounts to an assumption of ‘closure’14 (For a fuller discussion of the question of closure
in physical theories see [25]), which we define as the assumption that laws of Physics as
they are currently known are complete, irrespective of future observations. Interestingly,
in debates between proponents and critics of the idea of a Multiverse, the accusation of
scientific ’conservatism’ is often directed by the former group against the latter, indicating
an alleged unwillingness to entertain new speculative ideas and to extend our idea of what
counts as legitimate sciences, coupled with an excessive reliance on present-best scientific
consensus, bordering on in-group thinking. It is questionable wether stricter adherence to
the epistemic constraints of theory evaluation (most of all, that of empirical testability and
predictive success) can count as ’conservatism’, since only criteria of correctness warrant
the possibility of detecting an inconsistency in one’s theoretical approach.15
Progress is achieved via the correction of mistakes, requiring well-defined criteria for
spotting such mistakes. There is a slippery slope going from speculation-friendly method-
ological liberalism to a Feyerabendian ‘anything goes’ approach. The doubt can also be
raised that, perhaps, it is rather these speculative proposals that can be termed ‘conser-
vative’ by implicitly assuming closure – while in practice employing an incomplete theory.
We are not against speculation in science (and philosophy), indeed we believe it to be
an indispensable ingredient for the development of constantly revised and increasingly
accurate conceptual frameworks. However, the character of a speculative proposal should
be that of opening up inquiry by assuming a thoroughgoing fallibilism vis-a-vis current
orthodoxy and acknowledging protocols for the acceptance of new proposals.
Indeed, It seems to us that, today, all too often reference to infinity in cosmological
theorising is motivated by a hasty urge to treat our present theories as complete (at least
finite causal explanation (see the next section).
14This urge at having a ‘total’ explanation of reality, which is implicitly assumed to be complete and
therefore closed, has had a long history in human history.
15A recent intervention on the topic of scientific method is that of Dawid [26], who in the specific
context of a defence of the scientific respectability of String Theory, makes the case, more generally, for
an enlargement of our criteria for the acceptance of a theory to encompass non-empirical ones. Briefly,
Dawid proposes three standards for non-empirical assessment: (1) the No Alternatives Argument, holding
that our acceptance of the adequacy of a new theory should increase where no plausible alternatives are
present; (2) the Unexpected Explanations Argument, holding that our acceptance of the adequacy of a
new theory should increase where it is able to offer explanations for phenomena it was not originally
formulated to deliver; (3) the Meta-Inductive Argument, holding the more a new theory is capable of
being embedded into a whole of currently accepted and established theories the more we are entitled to
believe it. We leave a more detailed discussion of this proposal for a later publication, as it seems to
us that a key problem with this it is that, in the absence of experimental verification, there is a danger
that the determination of whether these criteria are satisfied becomes subjective. However, provisionally
accepting these criteria for the sake of argument, it seems to us that even then the multiverse hypothesis
fails, not meeting criteria 1, 2 and arguably even 3.
implicitly) and is thus employed as an unexplained explainer to make sense of (well-known)
puzzling observations. If it is the case that, broadly speaking, a scientific explanation is
one that aims at reducing the number of ‘brute’, or unexplained facts, to compress the in-
formation needed to offer a description of the physical process, it seems to us that to do so
by invoking a single major ‘brute fact’ such as the Multiverse, fails to achieve the desired
descriptive economy. The aim of a cosmological explanation should be that of providing a
deeper understanding of the Universe, but the Multiverse type scenario rather shifts the
target of the explanatory task from the finite observed Universe to a postulated relative or
real infinite ‘Landscape’. Indeed, while we endorse a pluralistic approach to the concept
of explanation, mindful of the difference it displays across scientific disciplines, it appears
that the ‘Multiverse explanation’ is an entirely sui generis kind of explanation, failing to
offer either a nomological (it is debatable wether the Multiverse scenario really is a con-
sequence of a complete theory), or a causal (Multiverses would be causally disconnected,
and the physical process responsible for their creation is, again, at best speculative) kind
of explanation for the observed Universe. We are not against the careful use of (‘weak’)
anthropic arguments in scientific explanation, as kind of ‘cosmological transcendental ar-
guments’ but we caution against over-extending their use: if observed variable X is a
condition of possibility for the very existence of the observer, it is trivially true that the
existence of a life-allowing universe in general, and of the observed value of X in particular,
is ‘explained’ by anthropic constraints. The problem is that the causal processes (spa-
tiotemporally contiguous processes capable of transmitting information) [28, 29] which
led to the existence of the observed value remain unexplained, and indeed the explananda
(these observed values) are not put in any relation of causal dependence (no matter how
indirect) with the infinite ensemble of universes. Anthropic considerations ‘explain’ why
we exist (and do science) in a life-friendly universe, but they do not explain why and how
do life-friendly universes exist. So, in the case of the Multiverse scenario, a causal expla-
nation outlining a clear chain of causal relations is replaced by an anthropic probabilistic
argument which rests on the problematic assumption of an extremely large (or an actual
infinity) of combinations of physical laws, fundamental parameters and initial conditions.
This is at best a speculative description of the universe we live in and its history (answer-
ing the question ‘what is’) but hardly an explanation (answering the question ‘why?’ by
tracking of the causal structure of the physical universe).16
16We here subscribe to a notion of explanation as essentially tied to causation. Wesley Salmon is
the philosopher traditionally indicated as re-injecting the concern with causation in the philosophy of
explanation, under the general principle that ‘explanatory knowledge is knowledge of the causal mecha-
nisms...that produce the phenomena with which we are concerned’ [28]. A more recent account, arguing
for a manipulatist account was defended by Woodward [30], according to whom the distinction between
description and explanation resides in the latter offering information in principle useful for manipulation.
While the practicality of manipulation is obviously out of the question in a cosmological setting, Woodard
observes that the notion can be generalised through the notion of an impersonal ‘intervention’ and un-
derstood counterfactually: ‘an explanation ought to be such that it can be used to answer what we call a
what-if-things-had-been-different question: the explanation must enable us to see what sort of difference
it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various
possible ways, that is to say if an intervention in cause X would have brought about a change in effect
Y. The Multiverse scenario clearly fails to meet this criterion for being an explanation: the conditions
leading to the present universe in fact were (are?) distributed across a very large (or infinite) space
of actually existing possibilities where either everything vacuously explains everything else, or nothing
explains anything at all.
The unwarranted assumption of closure which seems to motivate models with physical
infinities immediately poses another important question: how is it to be reconciled with
the openness displayed by the history of our cosmological theories? Our understanding of
the universe has changed dramatically over the last few centuries, and while our current
understanding of it is demonstrably more profound and accurate than it was just half a
century ago, there is no reason to believe that the unexplained features and parameters in
the current ‘standard model’ of cosmology, which are taken to justify the use of physical
infinities, will not be explained by a future physical (cosmological) theory without the
need for such infinities.
An example of argument proposed in support of the Multiverse proposal is the ‘historical-
progressive’ argument [31], according to which the Multiverse scenario is a natural, or even
necessary, step along the path of de-centring of humanity from a privileged and central
position, leading from the Copernican revolution to a contingently assigned placement for
humanity, and our observable universe, along an infinite spectrum of universes. While
prima facie appealing, we find this type of argument unconvincing. Of course we strongly
endorse the humbling effect that cosmological inquiry has had (and should keep hav-
ing) on our self-understanding.17 Nevertheless, we doubt that there is anything more
than a passing resemblance between the post-Hubble abandonment of a ’galactocentric
worldview’ and that of a ’cosmocentric’ one (in favour of a Multiverse scenario): the
two theoretical shifts are warranted by quite different methodological principles. The
revolutions referred to in this meta-historical line of argument originated as explanatory
conjectures but were subsequently unambiguously empirically verified, and remain today
object of continuous observational confirmation. Consider, for example, how the helio-
centric picture was slowly reached inductively, by painstakingly tracking the behaviour of
the celestial bodies, ultimately preferred to the Ptolemaic theory according to criteria of
simplicity and empirical adequacy, and much later also ‘observationally’ confirmed when
the first imaging probes were sent in orbit around the Earth. Or recall how the ’great
debate’ between Shapley and Curtis [32, 7] regarding the location of the spiral ’island
universes’ was finally, unambiguously, and observationally settled by Hubble’s distance
measurements based on the luminosity-period measurements of the Cepheid variables: a
conclusion supported by well-understood physical laws and causal mechanisms. The key
distinguishing feature of the Multiverse type proposals is that there is no possible obser-
vational evidence capable of confirming, or importantly ruling out, a (finite or infinite)
Multiverse, and hence of putting an end to this analogous twenty-first century ’great de-
bate’. To endorse the Multiverse scenario and postulate an extremely large or an infinity
of causally disconnected universes in order to retroactively explain puzzling data is not a
warranted extra step to make for those committed to the epistemic priority of physical
cosmology for the description of our place in the cosmos. It unquestionably involves a
relaxation (or, more charitably, a revision) of our epistemic standards and of accepted
criteria for the scientificity of an hypothesis. Abductive explanations, inferences to the
best explanation, are valid forms of scientific reasoning (generating plausible hypotheses
from incomplete information) but only insofar as (a) they are able to offer a causal story
(a possible explanation is a possible causal story) and (b) the proposed explanation can be
17Thus we want to ward ourselves against a potential misreading of our argument: we fully endorse the
secularising drive of cosmological de-centring, and the ejection of anthropocentric notions from physical
cosmology, but these cannot be used as a premise for scientific inquiry).
defensible in light of new, more or less direct evidence (suggesting another, better causal
story). The Multiverse hypothesis seems to fail on both counts. To reiterate: we are not
merely arguing that Multiverse speculations go beyond science because of methodological
shortcomings (as this has been the main avenue of critique so far), but pointing out how
they do not seem to offer any kind of explanation that would count as delivering scientific
understanding (an understanding with both a theoretical and a practical component): the
goal, we presume, of any scientific endeavour.
6 Economy of explanation, information and infinity
In assessing scientific explanations of finite real systems an important question concerns
their efficiency. This is in principle rather a difficult concept to quantify, but as a potential
first step a possible criterion that may be considered is the ‘relative information content’
of the explanation. There are many ways one may try to do this. One possible way could
be to proceed in analogy with Kolmogorov’s notion of complexity, according to which the
complexity of a sequence, S, corresponds to the length of a program needed to produce
that sequence. Thus a sequence is called random if the length of the shortest program
required to encode it is the same as the length of the sequence itself. Now consider a system
U and let the information content of the system be I
u
. Now consider an explanation of
this system whose information content is I
e










and still be treated as a reasonable explanation?
To fix ideas, consider our observable Universe as an example. According to our present
understanding in cosmology, the number of elementary particles in the observable Universe
is ∼ O(1080). Bearing this in mind, an important question is what would be the physical
status of (relatively infinite) numbers such as 10100 or 10500 in such a universe?
The question then is, would an explanation of the current Universe, with its ∼ O(1080)
particles make sense if it involves ensembles or numbers of constituents which are relatively
infinite (say ∼ O(10100) or (10500)) or in fact infinite in size?
Of course the existing Universe may in fact be infinite. The question then becomes
whether such an infinity can ever be operationally decidable/determinable in finite time,
and how to associate information with such a universe.
To summarise, for an explanation of a system to be reasonable, one would expect
the information content of the explanation not to enormously (or infinitely) exceed the
information content of the system under consideration. In that case it would be doubtful
whether the concept of (relative or real) infinity, or worse still that of Cantor’s transfinite
numbers are adequate as meaningful tools to be employed in order to scientifically explain
finite aspects of, or the totality of, the real (finite) observable Universe.
7 Why infinity may not help after all
In the majority of instances in which the concept of infinity (such as an infinite set of
values for a parameter or an infinite ensemble) is invoked as a tool for explaining some
aspect of the Universe, it is implied that the assumed infinite set necessarily includes the
space of required possibilities, including occurrences as close to or indistinguishable from
those required to explain the feature under consideration.
A key point often ignored in such attempts is that the required infinity is not just any
infinite set! Take for example a parameter which may be required to explain the current
observed state of the Universe, such as for example the required value of the cosmological
constant18, Λ. Imagine the real line as the axis along which the cosmological constant
can take its values. Now any finite neighbourhood of the real line contains an infinite
(continuum) set of values. So having infinite possible values for the cosmological constant
is not sufficient for it to take its observationally required value. We still need an infinite
amount of fine tuning in order to have the infinite set of possible values of the constant
to lie in the required neighbourhood of the real line.
8 Conclusion
We have considered the employment of concept of infinity in various scenarios employed
over the recent decades to explain a number of questions in science, particularly in cosmol-
ogy. By introducing the notion of relative infinity and the idea of closure, and employing
the concept of information content of an explanation, we have argued that scientific ex-
planations of the finite observable Universe (or any finite system) involving infinities (of
ensembles or Universes) are likely to be problematic, or in fact fail to be reasonable ex-
planations. While speculative ideas and creative leaps have played an undeniably crucial
role throughout the history of science (and are likely to do so in the future), scientific
theorising should follow some criteria of empirical meaningfulness, and its proposed ex-
planations need to follow an agreed-upon template of what counts as an explanation in
a given theoretical domain.19 We do not reject the Multiverse scenario because of its
speculative nature, but because it fails to be a genuinely explanatory hypothesis and
to predict any new phenomenon – in other words, failing to contribute to our scientific
understanding of the universe. The replacement of a benevolent, parameters-tuning de-
ity with an unobservable, and causally isolated infinite (transfinite?) set of universes is,
surely, a step in a naturalistic direction, but one trading faith in the supernatural for a
‘natural’ explanation which requires a state of affairs enormously more complex than the
observed Universe. Neither choice seems satisfactory. Science proceeds via trial and error,
observation and theory-construction, and in this context speculative hypothesis should be
considered when they offer an alternative finite causal mechanism which can lead to the
explanation of the phenomena under consideration.
18A non-zero cosmological constant of an appropriate size could in principle account for the observed
puzzling late acceleration of the Universe, while being compatible with all other known cosmological
observations. A crucial question is why does this constant take the value it has. Here we are leaving aside
the fundamental question of whether this is the only way to explain the late acceleration of the Universe
(see e.g. [33, 34, 35] for other scenarios for possible explanations of the late acceleration).
19We are not claiming that all explanations need be causal explanations. But we are claiming that,
in fields like fundamental physics and cosmology causal explanations in fact are the kinds of explanation
which are required for an understanding of the phenomena.
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